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A citizen-soldier of the Roman Republic:  
Beyond the literary creation
Abstract: The main aim of the article is to draw attention to the distortion of Republican 
Roman soldiers’ image. Some modern scholars treat the ‘ideal type’ as a reflection of real-
ity and attribute to legionaries the features desired by representatives of the social elite. 
Meanwhile, it seems that less wealthy citizens created their own vision of the qualities that 
a Roman soldier should have. This leads to the question of whether the officers and their 
subordinates had the same understanding of obedience and discipline. 
Keywords: Roman Republic, Roman soldier, military discipline, social discipline 
Contrary to popular belief, a professional army based on voluntary re-cruitment was not established until the end of the Roman Republic. 
The author of far-reaching reform, directly affecting the entire political and 
social system, was in fact Emperor Augustus,1 so therefore understanding 
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the specifics of the Republican armed forces requires consideration of all the 
phenomena that shaped the citizens’ attitude to military duties. The Ro-
man soldier was basically a citizen-soldier, with all the consequences. This 
means that the socio-cultural history is of decisive importance for the study 
of Republican military history, because without understanding who the Ro-
man soldier was, it is impossible to understand the course of campaigns etc. 
The social history of the Roman army has long enjoyed popularity 
among scholars, as a result of, among others, the large number of preserved 
inscriptions that pinpoint the geographic and social origin of the (mostly 
Imperial) recruits, internal relations in the units and the living standards 
of the veterans.  Ramsay MacMullen’s study on the relationship between 
soldiers and civilians in the Later Roman Empire was a breakthrough pub-
lication.2 Over 30 years later the same scholar wrote an article devoted to 
the internal ties in the legions.3 Both publications were closely related to the 
process of shaping a ‘new military history’ within which the combination of 
history and sociology (in the form of two research perspectives: ‘army and 
society’ and ‘army as a society’) remains one of the most important trends.4 
Although Roman military issues are still often described in terms of 
‘the Roman war machine’,5 due to the efforts of numerous scholars the 
studies 1979, vol. 3, eds. W. S. Hanson, L. F. J. Keppie, Oxford 1980, pp. 1005–1025; 
K. Gilliver, The Augustan reform and the structure of the imperial army, in: A companion 
to the Roman army, ed.  P.  Erdkamp, Malden–Oxford–Carlton 2007, pp.  183–200; 
M. A. Speidel, Heer und Herrschaft im Römischen Reich der Hohen Kaiserzeit, Stuttgart 
2009, pp.  19–51; W. Eck, Herrschaftssicherung und Expansion: das römische Heer unter 
Augustus, in: Studi su Augusto. In occasione del XX centenario della morte, cur. G. Negri, 
A. Valvo, Torino 2016, pp. 77–93.  
2 R. MacMullen, Soldier and civilian in the later Roman Empire, Cambridge 1953.
3 Idem, The legion as a society, “Historia” 1984, Bd. 33, H. 4, pp. 440–456.
4 About the primary assumptions of the ‘new military history’ see J. W. Chambers 
II, The new military history: Myth and reality, “The Journal of Military History” 1991, 
vol.  55, no.  3, pp.  395–406; J.  Black, Rethinking military history, London–New York 
2004, pp. 35–59; J. Bourke, New military history, in: Palgrave advances in modern military 
history, eds. M. Hughes, W. J. Philpott, New York 2006, pp. 265–266. 
5 The problem mentioned above was already pointed out by: A. K. Goldsworthy, The 
Roman army at war 100 BC–AD 200, Oxford 1996, p. 283; S. James, Rome & the sword: 
How warriors & weapons shaped Roman history, London 2011, pp. 22–24. 
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overall picture is gradually changing. Perhaps the key moment in the ho-
listic perception of the Republican military service (as one of the basic 
components of citizenship, closely related to the rest) was the publications 
of Claude Nicolet. He established the research perspective that the Ro-
man soldier was simply a citizen who manifested his social and legal status 
through military duties.6 Nicolet’s point of view perfectly complemented 
the considerations of William V. Harris, who had convincingly explained 
how the conduct of wars was profitable for the majority of Roman citizens 
during the Republican period.7
Nevertheless, the question of who the Republican Roman soldier was 
remains partially open. The analysis of literary sources suggests that the 
overall picture of Roman soldiers often did not coincide with their behav-
iour in specific situations.  It seems, then, that in order not to duplicate 
the ‘ideal type’ (as defined by Max Weber), attention should be paid to 
interpretation limitations and their causes. Otherwise, it may turn out that 
the modern scholar will unknowingly duplicate the idea of what the Ro-
man solder should be according to ancient historians, who were not always 
familiar with the military, but who wanted to promote their ancestors’ vir-
tues as an inspiration for the next generations. 
The ideal type has never been fully reflected in reality, but I believe 
that deconstructing such an image is not enough. The study of archetypes 
can provide valuable information on the characteristics defined as impor-
tant for shaping the citizens’ attitudes. It can lead to a partial resolution of 
the question as to whether the Roman community was founded on mili-
tary values. In other words, should a citizen have the qualities of a soldier 
6 C. Nicolet, The world of the citizen in republican Rome, trans. P. S. Falla, Berkeley– 
Los Angeles 1980, pp. 8, 89, 207, 384; idem, Il cittadino, il politico, in: L’uomo romano, 
cur. A. Giardina, Roma–Bari 1989, pp. 11–12, 17; idem, Rome et la conquête du monde 
méditerranéen, vol.  1, Les structures de l’Italie romaine10, Paris 2001, p.  303. A similar 
observation was previously expressed by: Y. Garlan, War in the ancient world: A social 
history, trans. J. Lloyd, London 1975, pp. 86–89, 91. 
7 W. V. Harris, War and imperialism in republican Rome 327–70 B.C., Oxford 1979. 
Cf. J. Rich, Fear, greed and glory: The causes of Roman war-making in the middle Republic, 




or did he become a soldier after being enlisted in the army? I am fully aware 
of the contributory nature of this article, but in my opinion to understand 
the specifics of the Republican Roman army, it is necessary to ask what 
characteristics were expected from a soldier, but also who expected them? 
The latter question is perhaps more important because it takes into account 
the soldiers, not just commanders and officers. 
Two possible perspectives
A scholar focusing on Roman warfare can easily fall into the trap of dupli-
cating the image of a Roman soldier reproduced by representatives of social 
elites without verifying its correctness. As Nicolet wrote in general:
L’histoire militaire, dans tous les sens du mot, de l’Antiquité est 
particulièrement délicate : c’est un des domaines où les anachronismes 
sont les plus menaçants, les distances physiques et mentales les plus 
difficiles à réduire. Non que les sources fassent défaut  : la tradition 
historique ancienne est essentiellement une chronique militaire; mais 
les déformations typologiques du genre, chez des auteurs qui, le plus 
souvent, ne sons pas des techniciens, sont nombreuses (...).8 
Then the expectations formulated by the nobilitas towards recruits of 
mostly plebeian origin may turn into a general vision of the army without 
the soldiers’ point of view, who in the history of Rome were never just 
a passive mass obedient to the commanders. Such a claim is confirmed, for 
example, by the plebeian secessions of 494 and 449 BC of an unequivocally 
military character.9 Perhaps the memory of past violent events resulted in 
8 C. Nicolet, Rome et..., p. 301. 
9 Liv., 2.24–34, 3.50–54; Dion. Hal., 6.23–28, 11.2–50; F. Cassola, Lo scontro 
fra patrizi e plebei e la formazione della ‘nobilitas’, in: Storia Einaudi dei Greci e dei 
Romani, vol. 13, Roma in Italia. Le popolazioni dell’Italia antica e la nascita di Roma, dir. 
A. Momigliano, A. Schiavone, Torino 1988, pp. 451–456; T. J. Cornell, The beginnings 
of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 BC), 
London–New York 1995, pp. 256–260; A. Ziolkowski, Storia di Roma2, Milano–Torino 
2010, pp. 64–65, 67–69. 
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attempts to force recruits into the framework of absolute obedience to sen-
atorial and equestrian officers. Despite all this, in the case of confrontation 
between superiors and soldiers, the former were usually were in a worse 
position.10
According to the Romans, the durability of the community was en-
sured by the continuation of ‘civic rituals’ – any serious disturbance could 
be perceived as a threat. Traditionalism was the basis of functioning in the 
public sphere, although its content changed with the passage of time: his-
tory was used to promote model, or even archetypal events and characters, 
because the main value was the patriotic and moral formation of the read-
ers. Roman historiography was written by the elite for the elite, often taking 
the form of family genealogies. Economic conditions prevented the emer-
gence of an alternative vision of written history, because the non-elite did 
not have enough free time (otium) and finances. Perpetuating the memory 
of great ancestors was used to explain the dominant position of the social 
elite (the idealisation of the past as a tool of political domination). Thus, 
exempla maiorum might be an argument to force plebeians to behave in 
a certain way, in line with the current political need of the most significant 
families.11 It would be highly incomprehensible if the above regularity did 
not also apply to the military sphere.12 The well-known example of Titus 
Manlius Torquatus, who sentenced his son to death on the battlefield, is 
10 The apogee of conflicts between commanders and soldiers was in the Late-Republican 
Period. Contrary to the widespread belief, commanders usually had no arguments forcing 
their subordinates to obey. Moreover, most of the conflicts resulted from the soldiers’ 
disagreement with the political intentions of the leader, which contradicts the dominant 
vision that idea of citizenship did not matter much for the Late-Republican soldiers. See 
A. Keaveney, The army in the Roman revolution, London–New York 2007, pp.  71–92; 
M.  N. Faszcza, Bunty w późnorepublikańskich armiach rzymskich (88–30 przed Chr.), 
Oświęcim 2017, pp. 75–230. 
11 F. Pina Polo, Die nützliche Erinnerung: Geschichtsschreibung, ‘mos maiorum’ und die 
römische Identität, “Historia” 2004, Bd. 53, H. 2, pp. 147–172. Cf. E. Flaig, Ritualisierte 
Politik: Zeichen, Gesten und Herrschaft im alten Rom, Göttingen 2003, pp. 69–98. 
12 See W. S. Messer, Mutiny in the Roman army. The republic, “Classical Philology” 
1920, vol. 15, no. 2, p. 163; S. E. Phang, Roman military service: Ideologies of discipline in 
the late Republic and early principate, Cambridge 2008, pp. 20, 113–115.  
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a clear proof of the educational role of stories about strict obedience pre-
sented as an obligation to the Republic.13  
The most important problem is the lack of sources to reconstruct the 
‘plebeian perception’ of military service, which may make some scholars 
skeptical. The attempts to define the general characteristics of plebeian cul-
ture have ended with moderate success.14 Nevertheless, the plebeian vision 
of politics was understood fairly well,15 and Nicholas Horsfall believes that 
plebeians also developed the frameworks of their own military culture.16 
Even if there is little chance of getting answers to certain questions, they 
still need to be asked, otherwise only a one-sided and highly stylised ver-
sion remains – that of the elite, using historiography to build a political 
position.
One example of a specific attitude towards common citizens is the 
passage from Marcus Tullius Cicero’s treatise De legibus (On laws). The 
famous Roman orator claims that the will of commander should be the 
only law in the army,17 which many researchers take as a confirmation that 
recruits drafted into the legions lost all legal protection. Meanwhile, the 
juxtaposition of passage with the content of other narrative sources clearly 
indicates that it was nothing more than Cicero’s vision of an ideal legal 
system, and not a reflection of reality.18 
13 Sall., Cat., 52.30; Liv. 8.6–8; Dion. Hal., 8.79.2; Val. Max., 1.7.3, 2.7.6, 5.8.3, 
6.4.1, 6.9.1, 9.3.4–5; Quint., Inst., 5.11.7; Front., Strat., 4.1.40–41; Flor., 1.13.20; 
App., Samn., 3; Gell., 1.13.7, 9.13.20; Cass. Dio, frg. 35.2; Vir. ill., 28.4; Zon., 7.26. 
14 N. Horsfall, The cultural horizons of the ‘plebs romana’, “Memoirs of the American 
Academy in Rome” 1996, vol. 41, pp. 101–119; idem, The culture of the Roman plebs, 
London 2003, pp. 20–30, 96–101.
15 See especially: C. Nicolet, The world…, pp. 343–381; E. Flaig, Entscheidung und 
Konsensus. Zu den Feldern der politischen Kommunikation zwischen Aristokratie und Plebs, 
in: Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der Römischen Republik, hrsg. 
M. Jehne, Stuttgart 1995, pp. 77–127; idem, Ritualisierte Politik…, pp. 13–31; F. Millar, 
The crowd in Rome in the late Republic, Ann Arbor 1998; A. Yakobson, Political culture and 
the people’s role in the Roman Republic, “Historia” 2010, Bd. 59, H. 3, pp. 282–302.  
16 N. Horsfall, The culture…, pp. 103–115. 
17 Cic., De leg., 3.3.6. 
18 C. E. Brand, Roman military law, Austin 1968, pp.  6, 66–68; A.  R. Dyck, 
A commentary on Cicero, ‘De legibus’, Ann Arbor 2004, pp. 7–11; C. Williamson, The laws 
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It is even hard to imagine why often experienced soldiers would be at 
the mercy of the magistrate in charge, the more so that there was no train-
ing system for the Roman officers. The young nobleman could at most rely 
on the content of the Greek military treatises he had read, the stories of 
older relatives and by staying in the camp during a military campaign. For 
legionaries like Spurius Ligustinus, who spent 22 years in the army, only 
a highly experienced commander could be a real authority, even if Titus 
Livius (Livy) described him as an idealised model of civic virtues.19 It would 
be naive to expect soldiers like Ligustinus to recognise someone as their 
master of life and death just because they came from a better-off society. It 
was not a coincidence that the plebeian military elite (usually serving in the 
rank of centurion) often took the burden of command on their shoulders 
during battle.20 
Representatives of the nobilitas could build a political position us-
ing the memory of their great ancestors’ achievements and well-prepared 
oratorical performances, while people from the lower social group were left 
only with their own deeds. For this reason, public speakers without a famous 
family name and oratorical education exposed the scars and advantages of 
war, contrasting with the inexperience of the elite, and therefore the ac-
tual or potential commanders.21 Thus, military experience directly implied 
a socio-political position. Since personal achievements were emphasised to 
contrast with the attitude of some members of the nobilitas, it means that 
both social groups built a different system of values.  The heroes of the 
of Roman people: Public law in the expansion and decline of the Republic, Ann Arbor 2008, 
p. 212. 
19 Liv., 42.34.1–12.
20 See F. E. Adcock, The Roman art of war under the Republic, Cambridge 1940, 
pp. 17, 21, 106; J. Harmand, L’armée et le soldat à Rome: de 107 à 50 avant notre ère, Paris 
1967, pp. 324–344; A. K. Goldsworthy, The Roman army…, p. 182; J. E. Lendon, Soldiers 
& ghosts: A history of battle in classical antiquity, New Haven–London 2005, pp. 218–219. 
21 M.  Leigh, Wounding and popular rhetoric at Rome, “Bulletin of the Institute of 
Classical Studies” 1995, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 195–212; R. J. Evans, Displaying honourable 




general public were victorious commanders, but we cannot forget about 
the plebeian military elite, so often appearing in literary sources.22
Perhaps the aspect most prone to distortion is the image of Roman 
military discipline, usually depicted as a symbol of severity. It may seem 
surprising that only Valerius Maximus associated this virtue, often glori-
fied by ancient writers, with the present times and not with the values of 
ancestors.23 Livy’s work is full of information about military disobedience, 
as Cornelius Tacitus’ or Cassius Dio’s. Many scholars, however, still propa-
gate a simplistic vision of exceptional Roman military discipline, ignoring 
a growing number of critical voices. William S. Messer diagnosed this phe-
nomenon as follows:  
No theme is dearer to the heart of the eulogist of Rome, be he Greek or 
Roman, than that of the unwavering obedience which was demanded 
of the ancient Roman soldier. As these eulogists view the power and 
achievements of the Roman state, the feats of engineering and sanitation 
and civilization which followed in the wake of her conquering armies 
and formed an integral part of their task, they overemphasize the 
strictness of the discipline which secured these results.  They are not 
aware that insubordination may be only the exaggeration of a good 
quality, the ability of the private soldier to think and act for himself, 
and that a considerable amount of mutiny may not be inconsistent with 
even the highest degree of efficiency. They forget that in the details of the 
narrative, as they themselves have told it, they have given material and 
incidents which qualify their generalizations. Polybius, one of the sanest 
of the admirers of Rome, is guilty of this fault and is one of the earliest 
sources of the myth.24
 It is worth adding to Messer’s argument that the state of ancient 
literacy meant that the official version of history must have been created 
by writers associated with the political elite. One of the most intriguing 
22 J. E. Lendon, Soldiers & ghosts…, pp. 212–232; R. Cowan, For the glory of Rome: 
A history of warriors and warfare, London 2007, pp.  102–178; R. D’Amato, Roman 
centurions 753–31 BC. The Kingdom and the age of consuls, Oxford 2011, pp. 11–23. 
23 Val. Max., 2.7 praef. Examples of severe military discipline as a relic of the past: 
Liv., 8.7.16; SHA, Alex. Sev., 33.5; Veg., 1.1. 
24 W. S. Messer, Mutiny in the Roman army…, p. 160.
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aspects of the Republican social memory is the possibility of the existence 
of an alternative, non-elite history. It could function among some of the 
common people as oral stories with different characters and versions of 
events.25 Needless to say, the assessment of figures such as Tiberius Sempro-
nius Gracchus and his brother Caius, or Publius Clodius (Claudius) Pul-
cher could have been diametrically different among the plebs than among 
the senators. Cicero even wrote about laying flowers on the tomb of Lucius 
Sergius Catilina (Catiline), the alleged conspirator against the Republic.26 
Many of Clodius’s followers were once associated with Catiline,27 and yet 
both were presented in the sources as careerists ready to sacrifice the state 
for personal benefits. Were they simply the representatives of city common-
ers? Plutarch of Chaeronea mentioned monuments of the Gracchi sponta-
neously erected by the people,28 which suggests that non-elite citizens could 
express their vision of history through celebrations or places of memory 
(lieux de mémoire). After all, the idea of an obedient and disciplined society 
rarely comes from the obedient and disciplined. This also applies to the 
military.  
Returning to military discipline, the quotation of legal regulations 
does not say much about their implementation. What is more, the law is 
not ontologically neutral, just like its creators: the law expresses the vision 
of the world belonging to the dominant group (or simply the legislators),29 
25 See C. Rosillo-López, Popular public opinion in a nutshell: Nicknames and non-elite 
political culture in the late Republic, in: Popular culture in the ancient world, ed. L. Grig, 
Cambridge 2017, pp. 91–106. 
26 Cic., Pro Flacc., p. 95. 
27 Cic., De dom., pp. 13, 58, 61, 72, 75; In Pis., 11, 16, 23. It cannot be ruled out that 
Cicero provided this information as an element of creating a negative image of Clodius, 
whom he considered ‘the second Catiline’ (Cic., ad Att., 1.14.5, 1.16.9, 4.33). While 
the juxtaposition of Catiline and Clodius was probably an invective, some supporters of 
Catiline could find themselves in the political camp of the latter. The hatred of Cicero was 
not the only common element of their political agenda (e.g. lifting debts). 
28 Plut., C. Gracch., 18.3.
29 A.  Schiavone, Pensiero giuridico e razionalità aristocratica, in: Storia Einaudi dei 
Greci e dei Romani, vol. 14, La repubblica imperiale, dir. A. Momigliano, A. Schiavone, 




which does not mean that it is universally supported. An unequal treat-
ment of perpetrators within the Roman criminal law leaves no doubt in 
this regard.30 
The significant number of military mutinies breaking out in the 
Republic may simply be evidence of an attempt to criminalise behaviour 
widely recognised as a form of civic and thus permitted disobedience.31 The 
Roman meaning of the term seditio is ‘collective insubordination’, i.e. any 
collective behaviour deemed unlawful by the commander.32 In this way, he 
could convict soldiers for any act against his authority, but on the other 
hand it allowed him to turn a blind eye to the crimes, as long as he was not 
able to punish the offenders. The history of Republican military discipline 
is the history of a constant power struggle between officers and subordi-
nates.33 Military discipline is always a reflection of social discipline,34 and 
although the German historians of law from the turn of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries created an image of Romans obedient to the law, it is 
difficult to consider the Roman citizens as particularly law-abiding. The 
same men who took part in the riots and were able to express their opinions 
decisively later became recruits – did they lose all personality traits when 
became soldiers? Definitely not. 
Taking into account these aspects does not mean accepting the Marx-
ist vision of ‘two societies’ or ‘class struggles’. The Roman society was not 
class-based in nature and the emphasis on the alleged duality of culture 
30 P.  Garnsey, Social status and legal privilege in the Roman Empire, Oxford 1970, 
pp. 103–152; J.-J. Aubert, A double standard in Roman criminal law? The death penalty and 
social structure in late republican and early imperial Rome, “Speculum Iuris” 2002, vol. 4, 
pp. 94–133; A. M. Riggsby, Roman law…, pp. 77–88. 
31 Cf. W. S. Messer, Mutiny in the Roman army…, p. 162. 
32 M. N. Faszcza, Bunty w późnorepublikańskich…, pp. 79–84. 
33 It is worth considering in how many cases the mutineers were punished and how 
many went unpunished. The decisive advantage of the latter cases shows that there was 
complete latitude in classifying soldiers’ acts as seditiones, depending on the authority and 
political situation. Cf. S. James, Rome & the sword…, pp. 112–113; S. G. Chrissanthos, 
Keeping military discipline, in: The Oxford handbook of warfare in the classical world, 
eds. J. B. Campbell, L. A. Tritle, Oxford 2014, pp. 324–325. 
34 For the Roman army: S. James, Writing the legions: the development and future of 
Roman military studies in Britain, “Archeological Journal” 2002, vol. 159, p. 40. 
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has nothing to do with it. Nevertheless, the concordia ordinum praised by 
Cicero is nothing more than a historiographic myth. If something held 
the cohesion of the Republican society, it was the current community of 
interests and the possibility of improving economic status through a net-
work of dependencies and clientele.35 However, it must not be forgotten 
that this is not the same as a community of values, which in some cases 
could have been opposed (e.g. the question and conditions of obedience). 
Guido Clemente wrote an article about the concept of ‘democracy without 
the people’36  – by analogy, the nobilitas’ attempts to shape relations in 
the army could be called ‘civic duty without the voice of citizens’. Even if 
this voice was not directly reflected in written sources, numerous cases of 
military disobedience indicate that legionaries did not intend to be passive 
performers of the commanders’ will. All scholars focusing on the Roman 
military issues should keep the possibility of two visions (elite and non-
elite) in mind.
Obedience as a military virtue?
It is striking that despite the evolution of Roman society, related to the 
gradual influx of the rural population to the city, the small landowner was 
still the ideal of a soldier.37 This resulted both from the positive valorisa-
tion of stereotypical peasant’s features in the context of military qualities 
35 C. Nicolet, Rome et…, pp. 189–190, 431; F. Dupont, La vita quotidiana nella Roma 
repubblicana, trad. R. Cincotta, Roma–Bari 2000, pp.  9–10, 19; E. Flaig, Ritualisierte 
Politik…, pp. 13–31. 
36 G. Clemente, Democracy without the people: The impossible dream of the Roman 
oligarchs (and of some modern scholars), “Quaderni di storia” 2018, vol. 87, pp. 87–119. 
Cf. F. Millar, The political character of the classical Roman Republic, 200–151 B.C., “The 
Journal of Roman Studies” 1984, vol. 74, pp. 1–19. 
37 Cat., De agr., praef. 4; Veg., 1.3; C. Nicolet, The world…, pp. 95–96; S. Diedrich, 
Römische Agrarhandbucher zwischen Fachwissenschaft, Literatur und Ideologie, Berlin 2007, 
p. 281. Flavius Vegetius Renatus probably copied the remarks of Marcus Porcius Cato 
the Elder expressed in his unpreserved work De re militari. This is indicated both by the 
fact that Cato the Elder expressed the identical idea in De agricultura, and that Vegetius 
referred several times to his predecessor’s treatise (Veg., 1.8, 1.13, 1.15, 2.3). 
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(strength, endurance, straightforwardness etc.) as well as from the close 
connection of right to military service with land ownership, i.e. belonging 
to the category of the assidui.38 The famous story of modesty and patriot-
ism manifested in the fifth century BC by Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus 
was used not only to build an image of a ‘golden age’ contrasting with the 
subsequent ‘decay of morals’, but also as an educational model.39 It can 
be concluded that soldier should be primarily aware of his duty and not 
become embroiled in political disputes. The centurion Ligustinus has been 
described in an identical manner.40 
Passive acceptance of the designated social role was beyond the imagi-
nation of many  legionaries. Compliance with non-negotiated patterns re-
quired the elite to offer something in return. On the one hand, these were 
social benefits (euergetism) or, in the case of soldiers, the possibility of ob-
taining rich loot,41 and on the other hand, maintaining appropriate forms 
of communication.42 As Egon Flaig once wrote:
Indes, warum identifizieren sich die nichtadligen römischen Bürger mit 
den Gemeinwesen, obwohl politische Ungleichheiten und wachsende 
soziale Distanzen dem entgegenwirkten? Gibt vielleicht die symbolische 
Dimension der römischen Politik die Antwort auf die Frage, woher 
die Willigkeit des römischen Volkes rührte, sich der aristokratischen 
Herrschaft anzuvertrauen? Damit nähern wir uns die Problematik 
des Gehorsams; diese erschließt sich am leichtesten über die Akte des 
Ungehorsams.43
Going beyond the usual pattern that the main military virtues were 
bravery (Virtus, in a wider sense: manliness) and honour (Honos) requires 
38 Cic., Top., 2.10; De rep., 2.22.40. 
39 MRR, 1.39. 
40 Liv., 42.34.1–12. 
41 P. Veyne, Le pain et le cirque. Sociologie historique d’un pluralisme politique, Paris 
1976, pp. 348–375, 425–451; W. V. Harris, War and imperialism…, pp. 54–104.
42 Ch. Meier, Res Publica Amissa. Eine Studie zu Verfassung und Geschichte der 
späten römischen Republik, Wiesbaden 1966, 24–63; P. Veyne, Le pain…, pp. 375–390; 
E. Flaig, Entscheidung und Konsensus…, pp. 77–84; idem, Ritualisierte Politik…, pp. 13–31, 
99–122.
43 E. Flaig, Ritualisierte Politik…, p. 14. 
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taking into account not so much the glorification of soldiers as the accusa-
tions against them.44 In this context, the exemplum of Manlius Torquatus 
punishing his son for joining a single battle without permission looks rather 
unconvincing, because the list of duels made by Stephen P. Oakley contains 
a lot of similar examples.45 Unpunished examples, worth adding. 
If anyone was a hero for the commoners, it was not Manlius Tor-
quatus but old-time plebeian battle-champion Lucius Siccius Dentatus, 
who in the fifth century BC won numerous duels and demonstrated many 
acts of bravery.46 It seems that at least some Roman politicians belonging to 
the populares realised this fact. Gaius Marius of equite origin, but lacking 
in significant political support also boasted about winning single combat 
in his youth.47 His publicly manifested patriotism was not based on an 
obedience to consuls, but on an individual act of bravery. Gaius Julius 
Caesar also understood the value system of non-elite citizens, so readers 
may find many examples of centurions’ and common soldiers’ heroism in 
his Commentarii.48 By the way, this is another argument confirming that 
Caesar’s works were addressed not only to the most influential and wealthy 
citizens. However, the question of how they acquainted themselves with 
their content is still open: this was most likely due to public readings and 
storytelling.49 However, it requires further research. 
44 On the military virtues: W. Eisenhut, ‘Virtus Romana’: ihre Stellung im römischen 
Wertsystem, München 1973, 40–43; M.  McDonnell, Roman manliness: Virtus and the 
Roman Republic, Cambridge 2006, pp.  12–71; S. E. Phang, Roman military service…, 
p. 17. 
45 S. P. Oakley, Single combat in the Roman Republic, “The Classical Quarterly” 1985, 
vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 392–410.
46 Dion. Hal., 10.37.3; Val. Max., 3.2.24; Plin., NH, 7.101; Gell., 2.11.3; Fest., 208 
L. Cf. N. Horsfall, The culture…, pp. 104–105 (about different military authorities and 
historical events considered especially important). 
47 Plut., Mar., 3.2. 
48 See J. E. Lendon, The rhetoric of combat: Greek military theory and Roman culture in 
Julius Caesar’s battle descriptions, “Classical Antiquity” 1999, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 295–304, 
306–322; idem, Soldiers & ghosts…, pp. 212–232; M. McDonnell, Roman manliness…, 
pp. 300–319.  
49 Horsfall (The Culture…, pp. 11–17) believes that songs were the original plebeian 
method of keeping social memory. Even if there were far-reaching cultural transformations 
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Republican soldiers frequently voiced their views on the contiones, 
actively shaping relationships with commanders. Rallies were usually con-
vened without consulting the officers, and freedom of speech was regarded 
as a fundamental citizen’s right. Superiors usually had no way of prevent-
ing this phenomenon, even if the soldiers’ intentions were openly hostile. 
A soldiers’ agency was often regarded by commanders as a personal threat 
or evidence of a lapse in discipline, while supporters of Nicolet’s thesis that 
military matters should be studied in close connection with other com-
ponents of citizenship consider the agency as an expression of civic and 
political awareness.50 In 69 and 67 BC the legionaries of Lucius Licinius 
Lucullus during the contiones deliberated about remaining under his orders 
or refusing to follow him.51 Even in AD 14, after the death of Emperor Au-
gustus, soldiers decided to address their demands to his successor, believing 
in their full right to do so.52 
The case of Lucullus’ troops is particularly interesting because Cassius 
Dio found the soldiers’ behaviour to be outrageous, even though Lucullus 
grew rich at their expense. In his opinion the legionaries were obliged to 
obey orders and show no initiative.53 Cassius Dio’s exceptionally negative 
attitude towards soldiers was diagnosed long ago, although he was reluctant 
toward most of the non-elite social groups.54 Tacitus also recognised that 
the rebel soldiers of AD 14 had no valid reason for dissatisfaction, though 
over time, the oral form of transmitting history probably did not change in general. The 
poor level of non-elite education, high price of copies of literary works and the lack of free 
time complete the picture. For this reason Horsfall emphatically titled one of his book 
chapters ‘Culture without education; education without school’ (ibidem, 48–63). 
50 F. Pina Polo, Procedures and functions of civil and military contiones in Rome, 
“Klio” 1995, vol.  77, pp.  213–215; S. G. Chrissanthos, Freedom of speech and the 
Roman republican army, in: Free speech in classical antiquity, eds.  I.  Sluiter, R. Rosen, 
Leiden–Boston 2004, pp. 313–340; idem, Keeping military discipline, p. 323. 
51 Plut., Luc., 32.3–4, 33.3–4. Cf. Cass. Dio, 36.16.2–3. 
52 Tac., Ann., 1.16–22. 
53 Cass. Dio, 36.14.3–4. 
54 D. Harrison, Cassius Dio as a military historian, “Acta Classica” 1977, vol.  20, 
pp. 161–162; L. de Blois, Volk und Soldaten bei Cassius Dio, in: Aufstieg und Niedergand der 
römischen Welt, Bd. 2.34.3, hrsg. H. Temporini, Berlin–New York 1977, pp. 2660–2675.
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he listed the list of their demands.55 Livy described the rebellion in Sucro of 
206 BC in a somewhat similar way.56 These are just three of many examples 
disclosing the negative attitude of ancient historians to soldiers’ non-mili-
tary activity. Again, Cicero’s postulate concerning the commander’s will as 
the only law in the army may be cited.57 It is a clear exposition of some elite 
members’ dream  to turn soldiers into nothing more than a passive mass.  
In this context, the words of Cicero about many favourable political chang-
es resulting from civil disobedience sound paradoxical.58
A completely different approach was presented by Caesar, who tried 
to build political support both on the basis of relationship with the elite 
and ordinary citizens. In the Commentarii he made it clear that he did not 
consider the soldiers’ initiative as something reprehensible. He had allowed 
them to make minor violations of discipline, because he wanted to be sure 
of their support at the decisive moment.59 Perhaps this is what distinguishes 
talented commanders from eminent ones.  In contrast, his adoptive son 
lacking in military capabilities, later Emperor Augustus, believed in strict 
discipline as the foundation of the effective armed forces.60 This civilians’ 
fear of soldiers’ ferocia (rage) was caused by the recent terror of civil wars, 
but deepened after the establishment of professional army:61 in the Re-
public there was no true division into ‘civilians’ and ‘soldiers’, but into 
‘citizens not currently serving in the army’ and ‘citizens engaged in military 
service’.62 In every family there was a man (or men) who was a soldier, so 
there was no fear of the military before the civil wars broke out. 
55 Tac., Ann., 1.16–17.
56 Liv., 28.24.7–9. 
57 Cic., De leg., 3.3.6. 
58 Cic., De or., 2.198–199.
59 Suet., Jul., 67.1.
60 Suet., Aug., 24.1. 
61 S. E. Phang, Roman military service…, pp. 42, 47–48. 
62 Cf. the course of mutiny of 47 BC when Caesar called his soldiers ‘Quirites’. Their 
indignation and regret was not caused by the fact that they had felt different from the rest 
of citizens. Caesar had symbolically released them to a civilian status and thus deprived of 
the expected benefits of war (Plut., Caes., 51.1; Suet., Jul., 70.1–2; App., BC, 2.93.392–
94.394; Polyaen., 8.23.15; Cass. Dio, 42.53.3–5).
40
Michał Norbert Faszcza
The changing perception of military service meant that during the 
reign of Emperor Hadrian disciplina was deified and began to appear on 
coins minted for the army.63 This may be taken as a proof of how much the 
Roman army changed since the fall of the Republic.
Another field of conflict were commanders’ attempts to usurp the 
right to keeps spoils of war, despite the fact that according to the law the 
capture of a city or stronghold was tantamount to submitting it to the 
mercy of the victors. Nevertheless, some ancient authors regretted the al-
leged cruelty and greed of the Roman soldiers.64 Legionaries defended their 
right even more strongly, because looting was one of the most important 
sources of profit, and sometimes their only opportunity in life to get rich. 
The commanders’ desire to bring looting under control confirms the ideal 
sacking model described by Polybius of Megalopolis.65 In this case, the es-
sence was to gain or maintain control over the profits of war, which boiled 
down to the question of whether armed conflicts still serve the general 
public or only the elite? Attempts to portray the Republican soldiers as 
an unruly crowd overwhelmed by greed is an oversimplification of a more 
complex problem. It would be naive to describe plundering in terms of the 
principles of citizenship, but it is clear that it was a kind of ‘strength test’. 
The establishment of the Empire by Augustus had ended the process in 
favour of the rulers. For a long time, however, the soldiers did not forget 
about not being a part of the ‘Roman war machine’, seeing themselves as 
the subject, not as the object of mutual relations.66
63 M. Ziolkowski, Il culto della Disciplina nelle religione dell’esercito Romano, “Rivisita 
storica dell’Antichità” 1990, vol. 20, pp. 97–107; S. E. Phang, Roman military service..., 
p. 91. 
64 A. Ziółkowski, Łupy wojenne Rzymian III–I w. p.n.e. Pochodzenie, podział, sposoby 
wykorzystania, Warszawa 1980 (unpublished diss.), pp. 23–34, 44–62; idem, ‘Urbs direpta’. 
Los miasta zdobytego przez Rzymian w okresie wielkich podbojów, in: Świat antyczny. Stosunki 
społeczne. Ideologia i polityka. Religia, red. B. Bravo, J. Kolendo, W. Lengauer, Warszawa 
1988, pp. 87–116; idem, ‘Urbs direpta’, or how the Romans sacked cities, in: War and society 
in the Roman world, eds. J. Rich, G. Shipley, London–New York 1993, pp. 69–91. 
65 Polyb., 10.15.4–16.9.
66 J. B. Campbell, The emperor and the Roman army 31 BC–AD 235, Oxford 1984, 
pp. 17–156 (the analysis made by J. Brian Campbell remains indispensable to this day). 
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Conclusion
Throughout the whole period of the Republic the Roman army was still 
conscripted, and therefore the Roman soldier did not cease to be a citizen. 
Military service, however, was one of the main components of civis Ro-
manus’ duties, and this determined the way most citizens thought about 
military. So when the preserved sources contain information about the low 
level of discipline among soldiers, the question arises as to whose perspec-
tive they express and whether the insubordination is not a form of the non-
elites’ perception of citizenship.  
Social conditions closely related to ancient literacy meant that au-
thors usually reproduced the vision of the elite, regardless of their attitude 
to building a political position on the basis of popular support. Different 
values professed by some common soldiers may be found due to the analy-
sis of their behaviour, often presented as anarchic and violent. Meanwhile, 
Roman soldiers often did not want to be a passive mass, and were not. 
The different perception of military service is particularly distinct in 
the example of discipline. Attempts to reduce the soldiers’ agency give the 
impression that the ideal of many commanders was obedience and lack of 
initiative, but the Romans did not want to relinquish their position guar-
anteed by the citizenship. Surprisingly, many recent scholars return to this 
vision. Its verification requires paying more attention to the behaviour of 
soldiers described by the authors, and not to their comments. 
Reconstructing the ‘plebeian military culture’ faces serious difficulties 
due to a lack of relevant sources. It can be assumed that they transferred the 
elements of their own tradition through oral stories, celebrations and places 
of memory. Commoners might also have had different military heroes who 
embodied values closer to them than strict obedience. These issues must be 
borne in mind when writing about the Roman army, because the popular-
ity of certain educational patterns does not mean that they were reflected 
in reality. Examples of soldiers’ activity prove that the Republican Roman 
army did not allow itself to be dominated by the vision of elite, unlike 
many historians who treat the sources quite uncritically.
